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STATE OF UTAH 
A M E R I C A N G Y P S U M TRUST, a 
common law trust, and J O H N P A U L 
J O N E S , R O B E R T J O N E S , J O H N 
R U S S E L L R I T T E R , D O N A L D 
W. M c E W E N and B A R R Y P H I L -
L I P S , 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. 
v. 
G E O R G I A - P A C I F I C CORPORA-
TION, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant 
B R I E F O F R E S P O N D E N T S 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
O F T H E CASE 
Plaintiffs initiated this action, not for damages for 
breach of a lease, as stated by defendant in its brief, but 
to enforce a Declaratory Judgment previously entered 
with respect to defendant's obligations under said lease. 
(See plaintiffs' complaint, Record ("R.") 1-42.) The 
material documents, including Findings and Judgment, 
as well as the opinion of this Court, are part of the Rec-
Case No. 
13919 
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ord. (R. 36-42; 383-425.) (The prior decision in the 
trial court is hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 6307/' 
and in this Court as "The Prior Case.") Case No. 6307 
was initiated as a claim for damages for breach of a 
"Fifty-Year Lease" ("the Lease") between the par-
ties and for a declaratory judgment as to the rights 
and obligations of the parties. Violations of that De-
claratory Judgment plainly constitute also breaches 
of the Lease. By endeavoring at the outset to charac-
terize plaintiffs' claim as one for damages for breach of 
the Lease, rather than one to enforce the Declaratory 
Judgment previously entered, defendant begins in this 
Court what it attempted in the trial court, namely, an 
effort to secure a retrial of issues already fully adjudi-
cated and laid to rest in Case No. 6307 and the Prior 
Case as decided by this Court. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
Defendant's statement of the disposition of this 
case by the trial court is not the statement contemplated 
by the Rules of this Court, but is a protracted argu-
ment that misstates both the disposition in the trial court 
and the record there made. Plaintiffs will defer to the 
appropriate parts of this brief rebuttal of the improper 
matters asserted on pages two to four of defendant's 
brief. 
The proper statement of the disposition of this 
case in the lower court is that the matter was tried to 
the court, sitting without a jury by agreement; that the 
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court heard the evidence offered by plaintiff and an 
offer of proof made through defendant's counsel,1 which 
offer was rejected; that the court thereupon ruled in 
favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, holding that 
defendant had continued to violate the Declaratory 
Judgment theretofore entered by that court; that the 
court thereafter made and entered its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, adjudging de-
fendant to be indebted to plaintiffs in the sum of $78,554 
lease rentals for 1971, $111,478 lease rentals for 1972, 
and $91,429 lease rentals for 1973, together with in-
terest in the aggregate sum of $34,398.66 and attor-
neys' fees in the sum of $15,000, constituting a total 
judgment of $330,859.66. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
In its statement of facts, as in its statement of the 
disposition of the case in the lower court, defendant mis-
states the nature of this litigation, confuses the very 
simple facts of the case, and makes abundantly clear its 
intent and effort to secure, if it can, a complete retrial, 
and reversal, of the Declaratory Judgment previously 
1
 Defendant argues in its brief (pp. 46-48) that the trial court's rejec-
tion of its offer of proof in some fashion denied defendant due pro-
cess of law. The trial court in no way restricted or controlled de-
fendant's presentation of its case. Defendant's counsel elected to 
proceed by a narrative offer of proof rather than by calling wit-
nesses. The trial court repeatedly emphasized that defendant could 
call its witnesses if it wished to do so. (See, e.g., Trial Transcript 
("TR.") 109-111.) If defendant now regards its narrative offer of 
proof made through counsel as insufficient, that error is not the re-
sponsibility of plaintiffs, of the trial court, or of this Court. 
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entered by the trial court that was in all respects mate-
rial to this case affirmed by this Court. 
The following facts are the facts that are material 
to this litigation. Where the material facts were resolved 
without question by the Prior Case (No. 6307 in the 
District Court of Sevier County and No. 12887, 30 
U.2d 6, 512 P.2d 658 (1973) in this Court), reference 
will be made to the findings therein. Where the material 
facts were or are controverted, the circumstances will 
be described. 
1. Plaintiffs are the owners of the lessor's interest 
under the Lease and the Declaratory Judgment here-
tofore entered, and have the right to assert the claims 
herein asserted. (Findings of Fact No. 1 in Case No. 
6307, R. 383; 30 U.2d 6, 8; admitted by defendant's 
counsel at TR. 95-96.) 
2. "Commencing at a time soon after the merger 
of Bestwall Gypsum Company into Georgia-Pacific 
Corporation, Georgia-Pacific Corporation departed 
from accounting requirements of the Lease and from 
the accounting practices developed and agreed upon be-
tween the plaintiffs and the predecessors of Georgia-
Pacific Corporation." (Finding of Fact No. 19 in Case 
No. 6307 (R. 392); 30 U.2d 6, 8,10, 13.) This finding 
was not attacked by defendant either on its appeal in 
the Prior Case or at the trial of this action. 
3. "The accounting procedures adopted by 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation since its acquisition of the 
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Sigurd Plant and gypsum properties in April, 1965, 
and the accounting books and records maintained by 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation are inadequate and insuf-
ficient to make a proper determination of the actual net 
profit or loss of the Sigurd Plant for the period 1965-
1970. Georgia-Pacific's method of accounting is geared 
to an individual profit center concept for each indi-
vidual facility of its conglomerate structure. The Profit 
<§ Loss Statements for the Sigurd Plant contain many 
intra-corporate allocations. The figure shown on the 
Sigurd Plant's Profit <§ Loss Statements does not re-
flect the actual dollar amount of the sales of gypsum 
products produced at Sigurd, hut is based upon a 
'transfer price' which is at least 9.8% lower than the 
'list price' of the product involved, and in many instances 
the actual selling price is substantially higher than the 
'list price.' " (Finding of Fact No. 20 in Case No. 6307 
(R. 392-393); emphasis added; 30 U.2d 6, 8,10,12-13.) 
Although this finding was attacked by defendant in its 
appeal in the Prior Case, the finding was affirmed by 
this Court. 
4. "The accounting records maintained by defend-
ant for the years 1971, 1972 and 1973 [the years at is-
sue herein], as applicable to the issues of this case, are 
identical in form, and in the manner of their accumula-
tion, form, and presentation, to the material account-
ing records maintained by defendant for the years 1968 
through 1970, which years were at issue in Case No. 
6307. . . ." (Finding of Fact No. 2 in this case (R. 
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102.) This finding is not attacked by defendant in its 
brief on this appeal. 
5. "Due to the failure of Georgia-Pacific Cor-
poration to maintain adequate books and records from 
which a proper computation of the net profit rentals 
can be made for the years 1965-1970 (the period after 
Georgia-Pacific Corporation assumed the obligations 
of the Lease), it is reasonable and proper to make such 
a computation by using as a historical base period the 
years 1962-1964 (the three years immediately preced-
ing Georgia-Pacific Corporation's acquisition), and by 
computing the plaintiffs' lease rentals for 1965-1970 in-
clusive, by using the historical base period of 1962-1964. 
Such computation further should take into considera-
tion the price declines affecting the selling prices of 
gypsum products actually experienced during 1965-
1970, inclusive. The areas used as a base for measuring 
such price declines should include all of the areas of the 
United States, except the Western United States, in-
asmuch as the unilateral decision of Georgia-Pacific 
Corporation to increase dramatically its market pene-
tration in the Western United States renders that area 
an inaccurate base for comparison. The balance of the 
United States is a reasonable area to use as a standard 
for measuring price declines inasmuch as the number of 
residential housing starts (the principal market for 
gypsum products) declined more in those areas than 
in the Western United States during the relevant pe-
riod." (Finding of Fact No. 26 in Case 6307 (R. 397-
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398); 30 U.2d 6, 13.) This finding was attacked by de-
fendant in its appeal in the Prior Case, but was af-
firmed by this Court. 
6. Defendant is obligated by the Declaratory 
Judgment previously entered to account for its net 
profits in accordance with the accounting procedures 
used by the parties prior to 1965. This fact is admitted 
by defendant in its brief. 
7. The only reasonable basis for reflecting the 
accounting procedures used by the parties prior to 1965 
in measuring defendant's net profits is the basis em-
ployed in plaintiffs' Exhibits 139-143 in the Prior Case. 
(Finding of Fact No. 28 and Conclusion of Law No. 6 
in Case No. 6307 (R. 339, 404); 30 U.2d 6, 12-13.) De-
fendant attacks this finding, as it did on its previous 
appeal. The finding was, however, affirmed by this 
Court. 
8. Defendant's accounting records for the period 
1971-1973 are equally as deficient as were defendant's 
records for the 1965-1970 period, and for the same 
reasons. (Finding of Fact No. 3 in this case (R. 102-
103.) Defendant attacks this finding only in part, as is 
more fully discussed in the Argument, infra. 
9. The same accounting procedure that served as 
the basis for the judgment in Case No. 6307, as exem-
plified in Exhibits 139-143, as affirmed by this Court, 
is the "best and proper accounting procedure for the de-
termination of the lease rentals owing by defendant to 
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plaintiffs for the years 1971 through 1973, in accord-
ance with the accounting methods employed by the par-
ties prior to 1965." (Finding of Fact No. 4 in this case. 
(R. 103)) Defendant attacks this finding. See Argu-
ment, infra. 
10. Application of said accounting procedure re-
sults in the judgment entered below. (See Exhibits 
139A-142A in this case (R. 114-119), which are ad-
mitted, indeed contended, by defendant to be the same 
accounting procedure as employed in Exhibits 139-143 
in the Prior Case.) The computation of the judgment 
is not contested by defendant. Only the accounting 
method is attacked, and it is admittedly the same ac-
counting method as was employed in the Prior Case. 
(See admission by defendant's counsel at TR. 50.) 
A R G U M E N T 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
FOUND THE FACTS AND APPLIED 
THE LAW AS PREVIOUSLY AD-
JUDICATED BY THIS COURT AND 
THE COURT BELOW, AND THE RE-
SULTING JUDGMENT IS THERE-
FORE ENTIRELY PROPER. 
Although it occupies forty-nine pages of text and 
four pages of appendix, defendant's brief, stripped of 
repetition and efforts to retry what has been settled by 
prior adjudication, represents only one argument, which 
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is fairly stated as follows: Defendant's accounting rec-
ords are sufficient to permit determination of net profits 
under the Lease for the years 1971-1973 because it is 
possible to determine the end price of all sales of gyp-
sum products in the Western United States from those 
records. 
The plain answer to defendant's argument is that 
it overlooks the many additional reasons for which de-
fendant's records were found "inadequate and insuffi-
cient" in the Prior Case, both by the trial court and by 
this Court. Defendant did not offer to prove, and can-
not prove, that the intracorporate allocations and other 
deficiencies that impaired the adequacy and sufficiency 
of its records in the Prior Case have been eliminated 
from its present records. Indeed, the evidence is uncon-
troverted that the records are still the same. (TR. 43-44.) 
Defendant did not offer to prove, and cannot prove, 
that its activities in the Western United States, 
as found by the trial court and by this Court in 
the Prior Case, and the effects of those activities, did 
not persist into the period that is the subject of this case. 
Indeed, any such assertion would be improbable on its 
face, for it is contrary to reason that such effects would 
continue to December 31, 1970 (as found in the Prior 
Case) and not persist on January 1, 1971. Thus, de-
fendant's records are also inadequate and insufficient 
in this case, as they were in the Prior Case, for the pur-
pose of determining the proper amount of net profits 
due to plaintiffs. Defendant made no offer of proof on 
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this issue. The only part of defendant's offer of proof 
that may be arguably related does not really reach the 
issue at all. (See TR. 103-104.) 
Defendant offered no evidence tending in any way 
to prove that the same base period accounting method 
that was affirmed by this Court previously (30 U.2d 6) 
was not accurate for the period 1971-1973. The trial 
court was therefore entirely correct in finding that such 
method was accurate, and was the best available meth-
od. (Finding of Fact No. 4 in this case. (R. 103.)) 
I n its brief defendant attempts, as it did in the trial 
court, to assert that plaintiffs voluntarily abandoned 
the accounting procedure exemplified by Exhibits 139-
143. This false assertion is made repeatedly through-
out defendant's brief. The short and compelling answer 
to this assertion is contained in defendant's brief itself, 
at page 34, wherein it quotes (for the only time fully 
and accurately) plaintiffs' counsel at the trial court 
hearing on modification of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in Case No. 6307 as follows: 
"Now, it may be that the records they have 
will not allow such a [direct] calculation, and 
if so, I suppose we'll have to go to some sort 
of an extrapolation exhibit, such as was con-
tained in Exhibits 139 and 143. . . ." 
At the time the Declaratory Judgment was modi-
fied, plaintiffs had no way of knowing what changes, if 
any, defendant would make in its accounting records. 
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Surely, in the light of this Court's decision in the Prior 
Case, a reasonable business man may have been expected 
to have modified his accounting records to restore them 
to the equivalent of the records accumulated and main-
tained by defendant's predecessor before 1965. When 
this case was commenced and the records were obtained, 
however, plaintiffs found that defendant had made no 
changes whatever in its accounting methods or records. 
(TR. 43-44; Finding of Fact No. 2 in this case (R. 
102.)) There is no dispute as to this faiet. Thus, neither 
plaintiffs nor the trial court had any alternative except 
to use the same accounting method that was used and 
affirmed by this Court in the Prior Case, because all 
of the applicable accounting records are the same. 
The possibly confusing effect of defendant's meth-
od of argument in its brief should not be permitted to 
obscure the obvious fact, namely, that if defendant 
should be successful in this appeal, it will have induced 
this Court to reverse entirely the position it took on 
the proper accounting method in the Prior Case, which 
method, on the facts of this case, is mandated by the 
Declaratory Judgment entered in the Prior Case. 
On the issue here presented for decision by defend-
ant's arguments, this Court was not divided. As we un-
derstand the position of the dissenting justices, the prin-
cipal disagreement with the majority related to the re-
quirement that the Sigurd Plant produce and account 
for at least 128,539,000 square feet of wallboard per 
year. The majority would permit plaintiffs to claim 
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credit to Sigurd for all product sold in the Sigurd mar-
keting area. The dissenting opinion of Justice Ellett 
would restrict the claim to Sigurd's actual production. 
That issue is not now in dispute, for defendant has ad-
mitted an obligation to account for as much as all sales 
within the Sigurd Market, which are greatly in excess 
of 128,539,000 square feet per year (See admission of 
defendant's counsel at TR. 65), and does not contest 
the position of the majority in the Prior Case on this 
appeal. The dissenting opinion further urged that the 
determination of net profits be made "under the guide 
lines which the Bureau of Internal Revenue would ap-
prove if no consolidated return was made." (30 U.2d 6, 
15.) Defendant has not attempted to present any such 
determination. Review of defendant's offer of proof 
establishes a complete failure to assert either that de-
fendant had made any such determination, or that such 
a determination was possible from defendant's records. 
Thus, the issues drawn between the majority and 
the dissenting opinions in the Prior Case are not pre-
sented again here. Defendant has not presented any 
evidence or asserted any claim in accordance with the 
reasoning or conclusions of the dissenting opinion. 
Rather, the issues presented for decision in this case 
relate entirely to the interpretation to be accorded the 
majority opinion, and the Declaratory Judgment enter-
ed and modified by the trial court. On this issue, the 
narrow question is whether defendant can overcome the 
deficiencies in its accounting records that required de-
termination of net profits for the period 1965-1970 in 
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accordance with the method of Exhibits 139-143, by 
the single expedient of offering to prove that its records 
show the prices at which all gypsum products were sold 
in the entire Western United States during the relevant 
period. If we were concerned with all of such sales, and 
if the absence of this total sales data were the only de-
ficiency in defendant's records, defendant's offer might 
then suffice. We are, however, only concerned with the 
proper part of such sales (and defendant has not as-
serted that its records showing final sales prices can be 
segregated so as to include only the proper sales). More 
importantly, defendant has offered no evidence and 
does not even claim that its records are not now subject 
to the other serious deficiencies that made them inade-
quate and insufficient in the Prior Case. If defendant's 
offer of proof had been that there were now records 
available that were accumulated and presented in the 
same manner and by the same methods as were em-
ployed between the parties in the pre-1965 period, we 
would have a different case. Defendant did not make 
any such assertion in its offer of proof because any such 
assertion would be contrary to fact. The uncontested 
evidence is, and the trial court found, that defendant's 
accounting records were in all material respects identi-
cal to those previously examined, and received in evi-
dence, for the 1965-1970 period. That being the case, 
the trial court was plainly correct in applying to those 
records that same accounting method as was applied to 
the identical records in the Prior Case in arriving at its 
judgment in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court should not permit defendant to secure 
a retrial, and a further appellate review, of issues settled 
by prior adjudication of the trial court and of this 
Court, The action of the trial court in this case conforms 
to the Opinion and Judgment of this Court in the Prior 
Case, and to the Declaratory Judgment entered by the 
trial court in that case. If defendant's argument is ac-
cepted, the prior adjudication, and the Declaratory 
Judgment, will be meaningless, and plaintiffs will be 
compelled to adjudicate anew each year. This would be 
the very result that the Declaratory Judgment was en-
tered to avoid* 
Respectfully submitted, 
Dennis McCarthy 
Clifford L. Ashton 
C. Keith Rooker 
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